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On June 5, 2025, the United States Supreme Court (“the Court”) rendered its opinion in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, No. 23-1039 (June 5, 2025).[1] The unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, addressed whether “reverse discrimination” claims, those brought by a member of a majority group, require meeting a more rigorous burden of proof. As discussed below, the Supreme Court held that such a requirement is not found in the text of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).

The Court offered few background facts in Ames. As related by the Court, Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, was hired by the Ohio Department of Youth Services in 2004.[2] Ames eventually moved into the program administrator role and, in 2019, applied for a management position.[3] The agency ultimately hired a lesbian woman to fill the role.[4] Subsequently, Ames’s supervisors removed her from her program administrator role and hired a gay man to fill that position.[5] Ames accepted a demotion that resulted in a significant pay cut.[6] In response to these actions, Ames filed suit under Title VII, “alleging that she was denied the management promotion and demoted because of her sexual orientation.”[7]

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the agency, holding that, under the precedent of the Sixth Circuit (which covers Ohio, Kentucky, Michigan, and Tennessee), Ames had failed to show that the agency had acted with a discriminatory motive “because she had not presented evidence of ‘background circumstances’ suggesting that the agency was the rare employer who discriminates against members of a majority group.”[8] According to the District Court, “plaintiffs who are members of majority groups—including heterosexual plaintiffs, like Ames—could not discharge their evidentiary burden at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry.”[9] On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning “that Ames, as a straight woman, was required to make this showing (i.e., of background circumstances to support the claim that the employer discriminated against a member of a majority group) ‘in addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima-facie case.’”[10] The court further explained that “plaintiffs can typically satisfy this burden . . . by presenting ‘evidence that a member of the relevant minority group (here, gay people) made the employment decision at issue, or with statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination . . . against members of the majority group.’”[11] Because Ames failed to present such evidence, the Sixth Circuit held that the agency was entitled to summary judgment.[12]

In accepting the case, the Court noted that the Circuits were split regarding whether majority-group plaintiffs must satisfy a higher burden to prove their case under Title VII.[13] The Eighth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Circuit Court for D.C., and the Tenth Circuit also require the heightened burden.[14] The Court granted review to resolve the split.[15]

In reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Court first noted, “As a textual matter, Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs.”[16] Title VII’s focus is on whether an individual was discriminated against based on her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.[17] The Court emphasized that “[b]y establishing the same protections for every ‘individual’—without regard to that individual’s membership in a minority or majority group—Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.”[18] The Court noted that its “precedents reinforce that understanding of the statute,” and cited to several opinions holding that majority groups can also be discriminated against under Title VII.[19] The Court thus rejected the Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule.[20]

In summation, the Court stated, “The Sixth Circuit has implemented a rule that requires certain Title VII plaintiffs—those who are members of majority groups—to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard in order to carry their burden [under McDonnell Douglas].”[21] The Court reiterated its conclusion that “Title VII does not impose such a heightened standard on majority-group plaintiffs.”[22] Thus, the Court vacated the granting of summary judgment in favor of the agency and remanded the case for further proceedings.[23]

Ames makes it clear that under Title VII, discrimination is discrimination, no matter if the individual belongs to a majority group. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this topic, or any topic related to labor and employment law, please contact us.

[1] The opinion is available on the Court’s website: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1039_c0n2.pdf (last visited July 30, 2025). Citations in this blog post are to the version posted on the Court’s website.

[2] Ames, at *2.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id. (citing to the District Court opinion).

[9] Id., at *2-3. The Court’s reference to the McDonnell Douglas framework refers to the method of evaluating disparate treatment (i.e., intentional discrimination based on a protected class) claims that rest on circumstantial evidence (i.e., indirect evidence). Id., at *2.

[10] Id., at *3 (citing to the Sixth Circuit opinion).

[11] Id. (citing to the Sixth Circuit opinion).

[12] Id.

[13] Id., at *3 n.1.

[14] Id.

[15] Id., at *3-4.

[16] Id., at *5.

[17] Id.

[18] Id., at *6.

[19] Id.

[20] Id., at *6-7.

[21] Id., at *9.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

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