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On December 5, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit rendered its opinion in Ismael v. Roundtree, et al., No. 25-10604 (11th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025).[1] The court provided guidance regarding the use of the “convincing mosaic” standard and the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis in discrimination and retaliation cases. This blog post will discuss the Ismael opinion and its importance for future cases.

By way of background, the Richmond County Sherrif’s Office (“RCSO”) hired Ismael in March 2020 as a deputy sheriff.[2] By mid-2021, Ismael was serving as an “officer-in-charge” providing security at a business as part of an ongoing special, off-duty assignment.[3] Ismael worked the assignment with Lieutenant Jenkins.[4] While working at the site, Ismael alleged that Jenkins frequently harassed him because of his race. As set forth by the court, “Ismael was born in the Republic of Iraq and is a person of Arabic descent. Jenkins allegedly called Ismael a ‘terrorist,’ told him to ‘go play in the sand,’ and warned colleagues that Ismael ‘may have a bomb.’ Jenkins admitted to making the terrorist comment but denied all others.”[5] The owner of the business testified that he “‘frequently’” witnessed Jenkins making racist comments to Ismael, and the General Manager of the business also corroborated Ismael’s allegations that Jenkins made routine racist comments about him.[6] Furthermore, the owner and the General Manager testified that Jenkins was deficient in his role at the business and was late for nearly every shift.[7] During this time, Jenkins served as commander of the RCSO SWAT team, which Ismael hoped to join.[8] Ismael alleged that Jenkins warned him not to report the harassment and poor job performance at the business, as that would lead to him not making the SWAT team.[9]

In mid-September 2021, Ismael attended a SWAT team training course and ultimately failed the written exam; Jenkins informed him he could therefore not join the team.[10] On the way home from the training, while driving his patrol vehicle and still in uniform, he stopped and visited the Burke County Sheriff’s Office and inquired about job openings.[11] He was told to apply online, and he completed his drive home.[12] Subsequently, Ismael filed an internal affairs complaint with RCSO.[13] He detailed Jenkins’s comments and conduct at the business, and the owner and General Manager submitted letters corroborating his account.[14] At the time, Ismael was in good standing and had no disciplinary history.[15] The Sergeant who conducted the investigation, McCarty, ultimately determined that “he could not verify Ismael’s allegations” and concluded that “‘[t]he complaint is not sustained.’”[16]

While the investigation was ongoing, McCarty received an e-mail from a Burke County employee inquiring about Ismael.[17] McCarty sent the e-mail to RCSO Captain Glen Rahn stating, “‘Lookie here.’”[18] McCarty also responded to the Burke County employee and spoke negatively about Ismael, asserting he had filed the complaint because he failed the SWAT training.[19] Subsequently, an RCSO Colonel, Chew, alleged that he received an anonymous call regarding Ismael’s visit to the Burke County office; McCarty contacted Burke County and confirmed that Ismael had indeed briefly visited.[20] In discovery, Ismael presented Chew’s phone records indicating that he did not receive an anonymous call at the specified time, and the parties disagreed whether Ismael was “on duty” or “off duty” at the time he visited Burke County.[21] According to RCSO, “‘[w]hether he was off duty or on duty, the act of using a patrol vehicle for personal errands is a violation of RCSO policy.’”[22]

In late September 2021, Ismael was slated to begin work at 6:00 p.m. and had scheduled a noon interview with Burke County.[23] Coincidentally, Ismael was called into work early, and he attended the interview in his uniform.[24] Subsequently, another anonymous individual called and reported that Ismael had attended the interview in Burke County while in uniform and driving his patrol vehicle.[25] RCSO terminated Ismael, allegedly for violating the department’s “‘Manner of Conduct’” policy.[26]

Ismael filed suit, alleging retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, although only his § 1981 claim remained by the time of the appeal.[27] The District Court ultimately granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Ismael had established a prima facie case but that he “‘failed to prove’” that the defendants’ reason for terminating him was pretext for retaliation.[28]

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the District Court’s ruling. The court began its analysis by discussing the McDonnell Douglas framework. As noted by the court, the McDonnell Douglas framework was introduced by the Supreme Court in 1973.[29] In short, under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case (by showing the plaintiff is in a protected class, that the plaintiff was well qualified, that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, and that the plaintiff was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees not in the protected class); once that requirement is met, the burden shifts to the employer “‘to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action’”; and finally, if the employer meets that requirement, the plaintiff has an opportunity to show that the reason provided is pretextual.[30] In retaliation cases, the prima facie element is modified where a plaintiff must show he engaged in protected activity (such as filing a complaint for discrimination); that he suffered a material adverse action; and that there was a causal connection between the complaint and the adverse action.[31]

The court stressed that McDonnell Douglas “‘is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement’” and does not play a role at the motion to dismiss stage, at trial, or in post-trial motions.[32] As relevant to the case at hand, the court emphasized that “McDonnell Douglas was ‘never intended to be the sine qua non [i.e., an essential condition] for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment motion in an employment discrimination case.’”[33] In Smith, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the so-called “convincing mosaic” standard.[34] The court held that (1) a “‘plaintiff will always survive summary judgment if he presents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent’” and (2) that a “‘triable issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.’”[35] The Ismael court made it clear that the “convincing mosaic” analysis “is a stand-in for the [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56] summary judgment standard applied to employment discrimination.”[36] It is not “McDonnell Douglas 2.0.”[37] The court stressed that “a plaintiff may avoid summary judgment by presenting a wide range of circumstantial evidence.”[38]

Next, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the “convincing mosaic” analysis is broader than the question of pretext under McDonnell Douglas.[39] The District Court, holding that under McDonnell Douglas Ismael failed to raise an inference of pretext, declined to analyze the evidence under the “convincing mosaic” standard.[40] The court held that the District Court erred in its analysis, noting that “[r]equiring a plaintiff to negate the defendant’s explanation on summary judgment has at least two defects. First, it is not required to succeed at trial. Second, it detracts from the plaintiff’s affirmative case that the driving cause was illegal discrimination or retaliation.”[41] The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff in § 1981 cases “must show that an illicit motive was a ‘but-for’ cause for the adverse action,” but it does not have to be the only cause.[42] Indeed, the court stressed that if the plaintiff’s protected activity was one but-for cause out of multiple causes, that is enough.[43] The court concluded that “we do not think the Supreme Court intended pretext to be the sole determinate at any stage of litigation, but especially at summary judgment” and held that “summary judgment should not be granted for failure to demonstrate pretext unless it also ‘reflects a failure to put forward enough evidence for a jury to find for the plaintiff on the ultimate question of discrimination’ or retaliation.”[44]

Turning to the case at issue, the court determined that “the District Court was wrong to conflate a showing of pretext with the standard to survive summary judgment.”[45] The court held that the District Court’s error was not harmless and required reversal for further proceedings.[46] The court instructed the District Court to “ask whether Ismael’s circumstantial evidence, when artfully adhered together and viewed as one, allows a reasonable juror to envision an image of retaliation and find in Ismael’s favor.”[47]

The court concluded its opinion by setting forth a roadmap for lower courts when reviewing summary judgment motions. The Eleventh Circuit reiterated that “[c]orrectly understood, McDonnell Douglas is a ‘procedural device, designed only to establish an order of proof and production.’”[48] In cases where the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, and an employer presents evidence to rebut the presumption of illicit intent, McDonnell Douglas is no longer relevant and “the court must proceed to ask whether ‘the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination [or retaliation] by the decisionmaker.’”[49] As the court noted, “a plaintiff’s inability to disprove the defendant’s rationale cannot be the sole grounds for summary judgment.”[50] In cases where a plaintiff does not demonstrate a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff “does not automatically lose on summary judgment.”[51] The district court must proceed to the “convincing mosaic” analysis and determine whether the plaintiff produced enough evidence to demonstrate a material triable issue of fact.[52] The court made it abundantly clear that it is not sufficient for lower courts to conduct only a McDonnell Douglas analysis, whether a plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case or not.

By way of brief example, Veronica formerly worked at Ares Investigative Agency, owned by Keith. Veronica’s direct supervisor, Duncan, often made discriminatory statements about Veronica’s colleague, Eli, based on his race. Veronica raised a complaint to Keith regarding Duncan’s comments. Within two weeks of her complaint, Keith terminated Veronica, allegedly for failing to discover who had stolen the local high school’s mascot (a case that, in actuality, Veronica did solve, but Duncan took the credit). Subsequently, Veronica filed suit under the retaliation provisions of Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act. Veronica introduced evidence demonstrating that no other Ares employee had been terminated for similar reasons, that Keith favored Duncan, and that Keith had told a rival Investigative Agency that Veronica was a “troublemaker.” Based on Ismael, the District Court, after engaging in the McDonnell Douglas framework, must also decide whether Veronica had provided a “convincing mosaic” of evidence to permit her to proceed to the jury. Given the facts as presented, it is likely that Veronica will be able to proceed.

Ismael provides much-needed guidance to lower courts reviewing summary judgment motions in discrimination and employment cases. We will continue to monitor the case law and will provide further updates as they become available. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this topic, or any topic related to labor and employment law, please contact us.

[1] The opinion is available on the court’s website at https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202510604.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2026). The citations in this blog post are to that version of the opinion.

[2] Ismael, at *2.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id., at *2-3.

[6] Id., at *3.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id., at *3-4.

[11] Id., at *4.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id., at *5.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id., at *6.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Id., at *7.

[28] Id., at *8-9.

[29] Id., at *10.

[30] Id., at *10-11 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).

[31] Id., at *11.

[32] Id., at *11-12 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).

[33] Id., at *12 (quoting Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011)).

[34] Id.

[35] Id., at *12-13 (quoting Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328 (other citation omitted)).

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id., at *14.

[40] Id.

[41] Id., at *15.

[42] Id. (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 340 (2020)).

[43] Id.

[44] Id., at *17, 19 (quoting Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 945 (11th Cir. 2023) (other citations omitted)). The court noted that Justice Tomas recently argued that McDonnell Douglas has “spawned ‘widespread confusion’” and that the Supreme Court should provide clear guidance regarding how to conduct a review on summary judgment. Id., at *17 (quoting Hittle v. City of Stockton, Cal., 145 S. Ct. 759, 763 (2025) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).

[45] Id., at *19.

[46] Id., at *19-21.

[47] Id., at *21.

[48] Id. (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. V. Hicks, 609 U.S. 502, 521 (1993)).

[49] Id., at *22 (quoting Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328).

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] Id., at *23.

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