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On February 6, 2026, the Eleventh Circuit rendered its opinion in Melton v. I-10 Truck Center, Inc., et al., No. 23-14175 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).[1] The court noted that the case required that it “decide whether an employee’s complaint of a racially hostile work environment can be supported by evidence of discrimination in his workplace against all racial minorities.”[2] This blog post will discuss the Melton opinion and how it provides important guidance in cases involving claims of hostile work environment.

By way of background, the court noted that Melton is an African American man who began working at I-10 Truck Center in March 2020.[3] The owner’s son, Jason Brigman, “participated in management decisions at I-10, though he had no official role.”[4] Joseph Andrews was Melton’s direct supervisor.[5] As related by the court, “All employees at I-10, except for Melton, were white.”[6] Melton worked as a salesman, selling, showing, and washing trucks, and completing the necessary paperwork, among other duties.[7] Melton alleged that he “‘regularly’ observed the Brigmans and Andrews make derogatory comments about all nonwhite customers.”[8] Furthermore, Andrews refused to serve nonwhite customers if it was possible to pass them on to Melton.[9] Brigman and Andrews routinely made racist comments regarding nonwhite customers, using a variety of racial slurs.[10] Melton raised complaints to the elder Brigman regarding the comments, but the owner took no corrective action.[11] As stated by the court, “Because Melton ‘heard such language . . . nearly every time a nonwhite customer entered I-10,’ and because nonwhite customers entered ‘frequently,’ Melton felt racial hostility toward customers was a ‘normal practice’ at I-10.”[12] Melton alleged that the comments caused him stress and anxiety and made it difficult for him to perform his duties.[13]

In addition to the above comments, the court related that “I-10 employees also used racial slurs to discuss Melton behind his back.”[14] This included calling him “token” and referring to him using a racial slur.[15] In an employee group chat that included Andrews, employees described Melton using racial slurs (the Brigmans were apparently unaware of the group chat prior to discovery in the lawsuit).[16]

The court next turned to the alleged deficiencies in Melton’s work observed by I-10 management.[17] Attendance logs indicated he missed many days of work and several hours on many other days.[18] There were also reported deficiencies in his paperwork and invoices.[19] In April 2021, Melton and Andrews got into a heated argument because Melton felt that Andrews had deprived him of commission payments.[20] The discussion ended with Andrews telling Melton, “‘Boy, you’d better get out of my office.’”[21] Melton complained about the comment to the elder Brigman.[22] Brigman admonished both Melton and Andrews for the confrontation, but he “took no action to punished Andrews’s alleged racist behavior.”[23] Subsequently, Melton overheard the younger Brigman tell Andrews that the company was “‘going to get rid of [Melton] but they had to do it the right way.’”[24] The alleged performance deficiencies continued over the next few months.[25] I-10 ultimately changed Melton’s compensation from a salary to hourly pay and criticized him for performing his work the same way he had prior to the April confrontation.[26]

In May 2021, Melton’s attorney emailed the Brigmans and Andrews “alleging ‘unfair treatment in the workplace’” and complaining that Melton had again overheard the Brigmans referring to customers and himself using a racial slur.[27] In June, the younger Brigman warned Melton, Andrews, and others of deficiencies in paperwork and stated that the deficiencies had to stop.[28] The day before I-10 terminated Melton, a customer came in to pick up a truck, but the truck was hundreds of miles away in Alabama.[29] For purposes of summary judgment, I-10 agreed that it terminated Melton on August 6, 2021.[30]

Melton sued I-10 and the Brigmans for racial discrimination, retaliation, and a racially hostile work environment.[31] For each claim, he relied on the federal law barring racial discrimination in contracting (see 42 U.S.C. section 1981).[32] The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of I-10.[33]

For purposes of this blog post, we will briefly note that the Eleventh Circuit determined that Melton did not provide substantial evidence that racial animus motivated his termination or that his termination was causally connected to his complaints of racial discrimination.[34] Regarding the racial discrimination claim, the court held that “[n]either Andrews nor [the younger Brigman] qualifies as a decisionmaker with racial animus.”[35] The court further determined that “I-10 provided legitimate reasons for [Melton’s] termination.”[36] Likewise, the court determined that Melton did not establish causation for his retaliation claim.[37]

Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the court noted, “We judge claims of racially hostile work environments under section 1981 by the same standard we apply to the same claims under Title VII.”[38] The court provided historical context for hostile work environment claims under Title VII and stressed that “[t]o prevail on a claim against his employer for a racially hostile work environment, an employee must first prove that ‘he is a member of a protected class,’ and that he was subjected to ‘unwelcome’ harassment ‘based on his race.’”[39] The court further related that a plaintiff must then prove “‘that the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of his employment.’”[40] Finally, the plaintiff “must prove that ‘the employer is responsible for the environment.’”[41] Importantly, “An employee may prevail by showing ‘[e]ither severity or pervasiveness.’”[42]

Here, the court determined that the evidence presented by Melton, taken together, was “enough for a jury to infer a hostile work environment.”[43] The court first noted that Andrews’s use of the term “boy” could be found by the jury to be a racial slur.[44] The court further held that “[a] jury could reasonably rely on the evidence of pervasive hostility toward nonwhite customers.”[45] The court emphasized that Melton “provided specific evidence that the Brigmans and Andrews routinely used racial slurs towards dark-skinned customers and made other, charged comments about them in his presence.”[46] The court held that a “jury would be on firm ground to infer from these comments that Andrews and the Brigmans were hostile to all dark-skinned or nonwhite customers and employees.”[47] The court stressed that Melton was the only nonwhite employee and that “the routine targeting of any nonwhite customer by a dominant white majority could reasonably make the environment hostile for a black employee.”[48] The court further noted that its conclusion was reinforced by the facts that Andrews and the Brigmans “regularly confirmed that their prejudiced extended to black customers, by questioning the source of a black customer’s money ‘[n]early every time’ a black customer paid with cash.”[49] The court also reiterated Andrews’s use of a racial slur to Melton’s face.[50]

In reaching its decision, the court stated, “we hold only that when an employee belongs to a minority group relative to his specific workplace, the treatment of other non-majority groups may evidence a strong racial preference for the workplace majority such that all minorities are racially disfavored.”[51] The court stressed that “[e]mployees must still establish that they were subject to at least some harassment based on their own race” and that “Title VII is not a ‘civility code’ to save employees from offense at the vulgarity and cruelty of others.”[52] But, the court held, Melton was protected in this instance given the evidence presented.[53] Thus, the court ruled that “[b]ecause Melton has provided substantial evidence to put that question [whether the harassment affected Melton’s performance throughout his employment or prevented him from improving his performance] to a jury, the district court erred in granting summary judgment against his claim of a hostile work environment.”[54]

Melton makes it clear that even where an employee’s claim of race discrimination and retaliation fails, he may still be able to prevail on a claim of hostile work environment if the conditions are severe or pervasive enough, and he encountered discrimination based on his race. Although the court emphasized that its holding is limited, it still provides important guidance in instances where there is racial animus present in the workplace.

If you have any questions or concerns regarding this topic, or any topic related to labor and employment law, please contact us.

[1] The opinion is available on the court’s website at https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202314175.pdf (last visited May 27, 2026). The citations in this blog post are to that version of the opinion.

[2] Melton, at *2.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id., at *3.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id., at *4.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id., at *5.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id., at *5-6.

[26] Id., at *6.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Id., at *7.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] Id., at *8.

[35] Id., at *10.

[36] Id., at *12.

[37] Id., at *15-16.

[38] Id., at *17 (citation omitted).

[39] Id., at *20 (quoting Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 2014)).

[40] Id. (quoting Adams, 754 F.3d at 1249).

[41] Id. (quoting Adams, 754 F.3d at 1249).

[42] Id. (quoting Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)).

[43] Id., at *21.

[44] Id.

[45] Id.

[46] Id., at *22.

[47] Id.

[48] Id.

[49] Id., at *22-23.

[50] Id., at *23.

[51] Id.

[52] Id. (quoting Reeves, 594 F.3d at 807).

[53] Id.

[54] Id.

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